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Abstract
We present a framework for the simulation and formal analysis of workﬂow models. We discuss (i) how a
workﬂow model, implemented in the BPEL language, can be transformed into a dataﬂow network model,
(ii) how potentially incorrect execution paths can be incorporated, and (iii) how the properties of a workﬂow
can be formally veriﬁed using the SPIN model checker. For the several model transformation steps from
workﬂow to analysis models, we use graph transformations.
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1 Introduction
In the past data was kept on paper. A piece of paper, containing information, could
be interpreted as sort of a token ﬂowing through the basic activities. This kind of
a paper is called the work item. The colleagues carry out activities on work items.
The workﬂow comprises all the activities. As such, the workﬂow deﬁnes the order
in which the activities have to be carried out.
Today oﬃces have signiﬁcant IT infrastructure to enhance the eﬃciency and
productivity often using computer aided business process coordination. There are
several languages that allow a very high-level, executable description of workﬂows,
for instance, BPEL (Business Process Execution Language) [11] or XPDL (XML
Process Deﬁnition Language) [13]. The complexity of workﬂows is close to that
of regular programming languages. Therefore, new problems arise with electronic
business process execution.
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Computer-based workﬂow execution involves communication between loosely
coupled information systems. This makes the testing of distributed workﬂows very
diﬃcult as data taken from several databases is often required to be manipulated.
Moreover, the side eﬀects of the transactions generated in a test phase need to be
undone. Another choice is to establish the entire test environment with multiple
servers and databases containing the test data. Both solutions are time consuming
and expensive.
As a consequence, there are several semantic requirements that a workﬂow has
to meet before enactment, such as:
• There must not be any deadlock. In case of a deadlock the workﬂow execution
would come to a halt.
• All activities have to be reachable. In case of unreachable activities there might
be unused resources in the company, which is far from desirable.
• Each variable has to be written before being read. Reading an uninitialized
variable could lead to an unpredictable result.
The most important contribution of the framework is the ability to check the
last requirement of those above mentioned. There are other solutions to verify the
ﬁrst two [1,7].
Fig. 1. The workﬂow analysis method
In this paper we discuss a method to formally verify the above mentioned proper-
ties of a BPEL model. As Fig. 1 illustrates the high level description of workﬂows,
such as BPEL, needs to be transformed into a low level mathematical notation
which can be veriﬁed automatically. We have chosen dataﬂow networks [2] for this
purpose.
The formalism of dataﬂow networks is meant to model complex, distributed
computing systems with well deﬁned semantics. The abstraction level of this for-
malism is between the BPEL model and the veriﬁcation model, the PROMELA
implementation. It combines the state based description of ﬁnite state automata,
and the data (token) ﬂow of Petri nets. A further advantage of modeling with
dataﬂow networks is that with additional rules and states of nodes, fault simulation
can also be performed.
Workﬂows can be checked against requirements such as mentioned above. The
properties of the process that are to be checked need to be formulated as linear
temporal logical expressions (LTL), regarding the PROMELA (Process Meta Lan-
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guage) [12] implementation of the dataﬂow network representation of the workﬂow.
The SPIN model checker [12] will evaluate these LTL expressions.
2 From workﬂow models to dataﬂow networks
2.1 Workﬂows
Workﬂow description languages resemble very much to regular structured program-
ming languages. The structural elements of workﬂows are the sequence, selection,
iteration and parallel execution constructs.
Activities have input and output parameters. These data elements are called
messages that are passed between diﬀerent computers running in a distributed
environment.
In BPEL data is maintained using variables. The value of variables may be sent
and received as messages, and the control ﬂow may be determined by them. The
manipulation of the variables is called data handling.
We assume that the workﬂow to be checked is implemented in BPEL, using only
a subset of the language. The transformation deals with the basic and structured
activities of BPEL - like those in Fig. 2 - and data handling but all kinds of event
handling is ignored.
Fig. 2. Workﬂow concepts and corresponding BPEL keywords
A small fragment of the workﬂow in an insurance company is shown in Fig. 2.
First, the client reports the damage which is recorded. Then the type of the damage
is established. Next the insurance company has to decide whether to compensate
the damage or not. This needs two independent activities that can be executed
simultaneously. Finally a letter is sent to the client containing information about
the decision.
2.2 Dataﬂow networks
Dataﬂow networks are designed to model distributed communicating systems. A
dataﬂow network consists of data processing nodes interconnected with channels.
Channels transmit tokens between nodes. A channel does not contain the token
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queue. In contrast of the original [2] dataﬂow network formalism, we deﬁne ports
which contain the token queue. A port is the connection between a node and a
channel. A token remains in the input port until it is not removed during the
application of a ﬁring. A port can potentially contain an inﬁnite number of tokens.
A token is an atomic abstract data unit represented by its color. Each node is a
ﬁnite state automaton that has states, and state transition rules. A rule consists of
two parts. The ﬁrst deﬁnes the ﬁring condition, the second declares the action that
should be performed in case of a ﬁring. During the transition the node removes the
tokens according to the condition, changes the state, and puts several tokens to the
output ports.
2.3 Mapping workﬂows to dataﬂow networks
In the dataﬂow network model the control ﬂow is represented by tokens of a special
color: the control tokens. The number of control tokens in the network corresponds
to the number of activities executed in parallel.
The execution order of activities can be deﬁned by the structured activities:
sequence, selection, iteration and parallel execution. In the dataﬂow network model
they are represented by at least two nodes. The one at the beginning distributes
the control tokens, the ﬁnal one collects them representing the synchronization of
the branches. The control constructs - that perform a selection - need additional
nodes to represent the evaluation of the conditional expressions.
Fig. 3. Mapping the workﬂow in Fig. 2 to dataﬂow network
Applying the transformation rules on the workﬂow in Fig. 2 results in a dataﬂow
network illustrated in Fig. 3. The rules are summarized in the table below.
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workﬂow pattern dataﬂow network pattern
variable a node with appropriate state space (see Fig. 4)
basic activity two nodes if the activity has in and out param-
eters, otherwise one node
sequence two extra nodes, one at the beginning and one
at the end
parallel execution one start node multiplying the control ﬂow, and
one end node restoring the single control ﬂow
selection (switch) one node at the beginning and one at the end,
the cases linked to each other according to the
order of condition evaluation
a case in a selection a node for each variable in the expression of the
condition
iteration (while) a modiﬁed selection with two branches: one lead-
ing to the activity being iterated and then back
to the condition, the other leading to the next
activity in the workﬂow
The transformation does not preserve the concrete values of variables. We only
use an abstract state space to check the order of the variables being initialized, read,
and written.
3 Fault simulation
A workﬂow execution engine can coordinate the work of many people, and it is
usually connected to multiple computers of independent organizations. These com-
puters are loosely coupled with no guarantee on their availability. Thus failures
have to be considered. It is reasonable to add some redundancy to the workﬂow
and then to check whether the planned fault tolerance was reached.
Error propagation [8] in the control ﬂow is modeled with tokens of a speciﬁc
color: the faulty control tokens. The abstract state of variables (i.e. “Written”,
“Written and read”, etc.) is represented by the states of nodes.
3.1 Simulation of dataﬂow errors
In this case the error is only spreading across the variables but it does not have an
eﬀect on the control ﬂow.
Fault injector activities are needed which write faulty data to their output re-
gardless of the input and the color of the control token they received. We assume
that healthy nodes always write healthy data to their output unless the control or
the input is erroneous. This way the error conﬁnement region of a fault injector
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variable can be determined.
Fig. 4. Fault spreading
In Fig. 4 a small fragment of the dataﬂow network representation of the insurance
company’s workﬂow is shown. Variable 1 contains faulty data. The red nodes are
involved with spreading the error among variables, the green nodes deal with control
ﬂow infection.
1. In the ﬁrst step “Policy read” receives a control token in its input port. Changes
the state “Control” to “Data” and sends a token of color reading to its input
variable.
2. The reading token is received by the node representing the input variable (Vari-
able 1). Now we assume that the variable contained faulty data i.e. the input
variable’s state was either “Fault written” or “Fault written and read”. The
state is switched to “Fault written and read” and a faulty control token is
placed on the output port.
3. A faulty control token is received from Variable 1. The state is switched from
“Data” to “Control” and a token of color faulty write is put on the output port
towards the second node of the activity.
4. “Policy write” receives the faulty write token from its control port, switches
the state from “Control” to “Data” and sends a faulty write token to its output
variable.
5. “Variable 2” switches to “Fault written” state and sends back a control token
to the second node of the activity.
6. The second activity node receives the control token from the output variable,
switches its state to “Control” and sends a control token to its output port.
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3.2 Simulation of control ﬂow errors
If a branching condition is evaluated using a faulty variable, the fault of the condition
variable infects the control ﬂow. This is illustrated by node “If” in Fig. 4.
1. The node called “If” is part of all the nodes of the switch construct. It receives
a control token, then it changes the state from Control to Data and sends a
reading token to the node called “Variable 1”.
2. The state of the node representing a variable is changed from “Faulty written”
to “Faulty written and read” and a faulty control token is sent back to the
node of the selection construct.
3. The faulty control token is received by node called “If”. It chooses nondeter-
ministically whether to pass the token to the activity called Accept, or to the
next condition.
At this point the control token is changed to faulty control, all the activities
that receive the faulty control token write faulty data and pass on faulty control
token. Let us suppose that the faulty control token is sent to activity Accept.
4. The faulty control token is received by Accept, faulty data is written as it is
shown in Section 3.1, and the faulty control token is passed on.
4 Veriﬁcation of workﬂow models
As usually in structured programming languages, in PROMELA too we can use
variables and subroutines called proctype. The types of variables are subsets of
integer in order to guarantee that the program has ﬁnite state space.
The PROMELA provides a further type of variables, the FIFO channels. This
way the channels of dataﬂow networks do not have to be implemented.
The SPIN is capable of exhaustive state space examination of a PROMELA
program evaluating system requirements in the form of LTL expressions. This way
the dynamic properties of a dataﬂow network can be veriﬁed.
The transformations are property preserving in a sence that every execution path
of the BPEL process can be found in the PROMELA program too. If a property
is valid, concerning the PROMELA model, then it holds for the BPEL process as
well.
4.1 From dataﬂow network models to PROMELA implementation
Dataﬂow network constructs are mapped into PROMELA language patterns.
• Channels in the dataﬂow network are mapped into the channels of the PROME-
LA language. This can be done since there is always at most one token in a
channel.
• Tokens are mapped into symbolic constants.
• State variables of a node are mapped into global integer type variables.
• Each node is mapped into a proctype construct. The initial state is set by the ﬁrst
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instruction. The state transition rules are implemented by an inﬁnite iteration
containing the rules as conditional atomic sequence of instructions.
• A state transition rule of a node is mapped into an atomic sequence of instructions.
4.2 The veriﬁcation
In Fig. 3 the activities called Premium and Policy are executed simultaneously.
An interesting question is, whether the fault of one activity eﬀects the other. The
requirement needs to be formulated as LTL formula, the logical variables that take
part in the formula have to be deﬁned in form of C style deﬁne macros. Using the
PROMELA source and the logical variable deﬁnitions the SPIN evaluates the LTL
formula.
Example 4.1 Here we demonstrate how to formulate the requirement which states
that the fault of activity “Policy out” should have no eﬀect on “Policy in” regarding
the model illustrated in Fig. 3.
#define Policy_out state_Policy_output!=Fault_written
#define Premium_in state_Premium_input!=Fault_written
G(!Policy_out -> Premium_in)
The ﬁrst two lines deﬁne the meaning of the logical variables contributing to the
value of the logical expression in the third line. Variable “Policy out” is true, if and
only if the value of the PROMELA variable “state Policy output” is “Fault written”.
The meaning of “Premium in” is deﬁned analogously. The LTL formula of the re-
quirement is shown in the third line. It states that at any state along the discrete
time-line where “Policy out” is false, “Premium in” is true.
The evaluation of a formula, such as the one shown in Example 4.1, can result in
positive and negative answers. The positive result guarantees that the PROMELA
model meets the requirement. The negative may be a good test case of the BPEL
process. However, because of the concrete values of BPEL variables, the process
may not be able to run into the faulty execution path.
5 Related work
There is much research done about the formal veriﬁcation of workﬂows implemented
in several languages. In [9] a BPEL process is directly transformed into PROMELA
code, the requirements are veriﬁed by SPIN. This approach is similar to ours. The
major diﬀerence is that we use an intermediate formal model of workﬂows, dataﬂow
networks. This allows us to implement the workﬂow - PROMELA transformation
in two steps, each a smaller step in abstraction level.
In [1] the formal semantics of workﬂow models are deﬁned by Petri nets. This
approach focuses on the syntactic properties of workﬂows but the insertion of struc-
tural ﬂaws, such as hanging paths resulting in unnecessary tasks is prevented by
the XML validation of the above mentioned languages. The authors of [7] discuss a
design procedure to transform a business model of the workﬂow into the IT model
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that requires the decisions of engineers. The IT model is represented by Commu-
nicating Nondeterministic Automata that can be analyzed with NuSMV [5] model
checker. As it is shown in [10] colored Petri nets can also be used as a formal model
of workﬂows. When modeling with dataﬂow networks, we also have the advantage
of the formalism’s compositionality.
Another approach is presented by [3] to enhance the quality of a workﬂow by
runtime monitoring. This technique could be successfully applied in a business en-
vironment with services and processes changing frequently. Our veriﬁcation method
is meant to be used at design time but could also be helpful to verify the implemen-
tation of a small change in an already enacted business process.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a method to check correctness properties of workﬂows
implemented in BPEL. Dataﬂow networks are used to deﬁne the formal semantics
of the workﬂow. The BPEL model is mapped into dataﬂow network, the dataﬂow
network is mapped into a PROMELA model.
The model transformations, creating the dataﬂow network model of the workﬂow
and generating the PROMELA code, are implemented as graph transformations ex-
ecuted within the VIATRA2 (Visual Automated Transformations) framework [14].
The VIATRA2 combines the procedural and declarative programming paradigms,
enabling the eﬃcient formulation of the implementation of model transformations.
The source of the transformation illustrated in Fig. 3 contains 42 graph patterns
and several ASM rules. There is a graph transformation rule for each important con-
struct of the BPEL language. The dataﬂow network - PROMELA transformation
consists of 32 graph patterns.
In the future we plan to support the automated generation of LTL expressions
from the requirements formulated in the BPEL domain. Furthermore, the automatic
back annotation of the counterexample, presented by the SPIN in case of a negative
result, is also a future goal.
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